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1 Introduction
Some récent empirical works show that the convergence process of some
European cohésion countries hides more régional inequalities inside each of
them. Spain and Portugal hâve strongly converged towards the European
countries but hâve also known an increasing phenomenon of régional inequa
lities (Quah (1996)). This is consistent with the results of Martin (1998)
which confirai a global convergence at the countries level but suggest that
régions inside them don't participate in this process. Thèse empirical re
sults are in sharp contrast with the sums devoted to the european régional
policy. One third of the community budget was devoted to this policy for
the period from 1994 to 1999. For european policy makers. the réduction
in régional inequalities must promote higher growth at the national and
european levels. The preceding empirical works suggest that there are not
clear évidences of such positive relation between less régional inequalities
and growth. Then, policy makers would face a possible dilemma between
régional cohésion and national or european growth. This gives rise to two
theoretical questions.
What are the économie mechanisms at the origin of such dilemma ?
For Kuznets (1966), the agglomération of économie activities may be a fact
linked with the économie growth. A more récent literature using both éco
nomie geography (see Krugman, (1991) and Martin and Rogers (1995)) and
endogenous growth (Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991))
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frameworks gives some interesting theoretical answers to this question. By
using such framework with no labor migration and perfect capital mobility,
Martin and Ottaviano (1999) show that an increase in industrial concentra
tion in a région where R&D activities are performed has a positive effect on
the national growth. This relation is due to perfectly localized knowledge
spillovers. With this assumption, more agglomération promotes technologi-
cal interactions that reduce the cost of innovation and increase the création
of new économie activities. This relation has a strong policy implication in
the european context : is public support able to make disappear this trade-off
between aggregate growth and less agglomération of économie activities ?
Martin (1999) introduces the rôle of public infrastructures in the en-
dogenous geography and growth model of Martin and Ottaviano (1999). In
this paper, Martin (1999) shows that most of the traditional régional poli-
cies applied in Europe are faced with a trade-off between growth and the
spatial distribution of économie activities. For instance, a public investment
in inter-regional transport infrastructures may not lead to a lower industrial
concentration in a rich région. With increasing returns and as long as this
région has a larger market size, this investment will increase its attracti-
veness. Nevertheless, with localized knowledge spillovers, this shift in the
geography has a positive effect on the growth rate. This resuit suggests that
the european priority for inter-regional infrastructures may hâve a complex
impact on régional development.
Our paper is an extension of Martin (1999) which stresses on the rôle
of knowledge spillovers on the public policies results. By introducing imper-
fect inter-regional spillovers in R&D, we ask whether a déconcentration of
technological interactions may be a purpose of public policy leading to hi-
gher growth and less régional inequalities. We also analyze which investment
in infrastructures should be privileged in this purpose.
Many récent empirical works suggest that knowledge spillovers are nei-
ther local nor global but are imperfectly transmitted between régions (see
Eaton and Kortum (1997), Caballero and Jaffe (1993), Maurseth and Vers-
pagen (1999)). Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano (2001) introduces imperfect
inter-regional spillovers in an économie geography and growth model with
no capital mobility. The authors show that contrary to a decrease in the
transport cost on goods, more flows of knowledge between régions can make
a core-periphery equilibrium unstable. An increase in inter-regional spillo
vers créâtes an industrialization in the poor régions and fosters convergence
in industrial geography and in incomes. Nevertheless, this convergence leads
to a lower global growth rate because of the loss of intra-regional spillovers
in the rich région. Contrary to Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano (2001), we
assume a perfect capital mobility and we model différent infrastructures
that the public policies may improve in order to facilitate inter-regional
spillovers. Two différent infrastructures are distinguished.
First, we assume that transport infrastructures between régions do
not only affect trade in goods but also facilitate knowledge flows betweenStéphane Riou 243
them. Baldwin. Forslid, Martin. Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2001) sug-
gest that trades in goods and in ideas are two processes which are certainly
intertwined. We propose an original modeling of tins phenomenon.
Second, we link knowledge flows with télécommunication infrastruc
tures. For Quah (2000). the expansion of thèse infrastructures modifies the
interactions between firms by lowering the impediment of distance. Thèse
last years, various projects aiming at improving numerical networks in the
poor european régions hâve been sustained by the European Social Fund.
This proves that the European Union becomes aware of the new possibi-
lities offered by thèse infrastructures. The model displays that through its
impact on knowledge diffusion, an investment in inter-regional transport
infrastructures can lead to a relocation of firms in the poor région. Never-
theless, this original centrifugal effect is more than offset by the traditional
centripetal effect due to pecuniary externalities. In this case, the public po-
licy increases the agglomération of firms in the rich région and générâtes a
positive effect on the aggregate growth. We show that only a policy which
facilitâtes knowledge flows between régions by an improvement in télécom
munication infrastructures can attain the objectives of higher growth and
régional equity. Finally, we propose a welfare analysis. Because of a positive
growth effect, both régions gain from more agglomération in the rich one.
Nevertheless. thèse gains decrease with the quality level of télécommunica
tion infrastructures.
The gênerai framework developed by Martin et Ottaviano (1999) is
presented in the next section. Section 3 présents our assumptions concerning
knowledge spillovers and we dérives the equilibrium growth rate which dé
pends on geography. Section 4 defines the steady state equilibrium. Section
5 analyzes the effects of public policies and how the welfare in each région
is sensitive to geography.
2 The model of Martin and Ottaviano (1999)
2.1 The gênerai framework
The gênerai framework is similar to Martin and Ottaviano (1999). The mo
del is based on two régions called a and b. Each région is endowed with a
fixed amount of labor, L = La = Lb, which lias no possibilities to migrate
but are mobile between sectors. Labor can be used to produce a homoge-
neous and numéraire good Y and differentiated technological goods which
are aggregated into a composite good D.
Call N the total number of varieties available in the economy. Pré
férences are instantaneously Cobb-Douglas and intertemporally CES with244 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(3), 2003
unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution :
]A (1) = I
Jo
where Cy is the individual consumption of the homogeneous good and p > 0
is the rate of time préférence, a e]0,1[ is the share of expenditure devoted




J Di(t)^-di\ ,<t>1 (2)
a is the elasticity of substitution between varieties as well as own-price
elasticity of demand for each variety. As Grossman and Helpman (1991),
growth will come from an increase in the variety of goods measured by N.




Ea= p°Dfadi + / rp°Dfdi + pyC^r (3)
Dfa and Dfb are demands of a consumer located in région a in variety i
produced in a and b. pi is the price of the i — th variety and ra° (n6) is the
number of varieties produced in région a (6), such that N = na +nb.
As in Samuelson (1954) and in the new économie geography models,
transport cost is modeled in the form of an iceberg cost. r is more than 1
so that only a fraction of the good purchased is consumed.
In order to tie down the wage rate of the economy w, the homogeneous
and numéraire good is costlessly traded. This homogeneous good is produced
using only labor with constant returns to scale in a perfectly compétitive
sector. Without loss of generality, the input requirement is set to 1. For
convenience, the demand of this good in the whole economy is large enough
that it cannot be satisfied by production in one région only. This assumption
ensures that in equilibrium the homogeneous good will be produced in both
régions. Hence, because of free trade and the choice of Y as the numéraire,
the wage rate and the price of Y are equal to one everywhere.
The differentiated goods are produced in a monopolistically compéti
tive sector. Each variety is produced with increasing returns to scale. This
ensures that each firm produces only its own variety. For the production of
a variety to be possible, a blueprint has to be invented first. Therefore, de-
velopment of a blueprint represents a fixed cost. After registration, a patent
gives an infinitely lived property right. For convenience, research is perfor-
med by firms themselves which then use the invention to start production.
Furthermore, innovation and production processes can be conducted in dif
férent régions. Finally, to close the model, it is necessary to specify the ins
titution that governs the intertemporal allocation of resources. There existsStéphane Riou 245
a financial market where a safe bond is traded and bears an interest rate r
in units of the numéraire. This market is global : the régional origin of the
participants doesn't matter. By this market, firms finance their investment
in R&D. Therefore, the total individual income is composed of the wage rate
equal to one and of the investment returns in innovation. Call Ha and Hb,
total investment endowments in région a and 6. Thèse endowments being
completely used for ail t, we hâve :
Ha + Hb = na + nh = N (4)
For innovation to happen at ail, some investment endowments Ha{0)
and Hb(0) or blueprints n°(0), nb(0) are assumed to be owned by consumera
from the start with an inequality such that :
Ha{0) >Hb{0) (5)
which implies :
na(0) > nb{0) (6)
This initial asymmetry will give rise to more important rents of capital
in région a and then, to an income and expenditure inequality between
régions.
We may précise the main conséquences of the capital mobility compa-
red with the capital immobility assumption made in the endogenous growth
and geography model of Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano (2001). Because
of capital mobility, profits will be repatriated in the région where capital
is owned. This means that the incentives to accumulate capital wili be the
same in both régions and will not dépend on the location of firms. With
such assumption, the share of capital owned by each région is permanent
and fully given by the initial distribution of capital ownership between the
two régions1.
The solution of the model only requires the characterization of the
steady state. Call 7 = ^ 6 [0,1], the share of varieties or firms producing
in région o. Therefore, ï — 7 gives the share of firms locating in région 6. At
the steady state, the level of agglomération in région a, 7, the growth rate,
g = jç, and the expenditures i?aand Eb are constant. Then, we will define
the equilibrium relations between thèse three endogenous variables.
With capital and labor immobitity, Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano (1999) show that the number of firms
located in a région and the capital ownership in this région are strictly identical. In such case, the profits and
the incentives to accumulate capital may be différent between régions. Then, the initial ownership of capital
may not be permanent and catastrophic agglomération may appear (cf. Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano
and Robert-Nicoud (2003)).246 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(3), 2003
2.2 The equilibrium location of production
2.2.1 The producer equilibrium
The supply of one unit of each variety requires /3 units of labor inter-
sectorially mobile. The profits of a typical producer are :
7TO'6 = Pa<bXa'b - 0WXa>b (7)
where w = 1 and xa'b is the output or size of a typical firm in equilibrium,
locating its production in région a or b. Maximization of profits implies that
firms mark up price over marginal cost by a factor cr/{a — 1). Therefore,
optimal pricing for any variety and operating profits are :
and
a.b _ @X<1' (g\
2.2.2 The consumer equilibrium
Consumers solve their maximization problem in two separate steps.
First, the static demands of a représentative consumer in homogeneous
and differentiated goods are derived from utility maximization (cf. (1) and
(2)) subject to the budget constraint (3). For a représentative consumer
living in région a, this gives the usual following demands :
Ya = (1 - a)Ea (10)
Dfa = -^^ aEahe (11)
fia na ' -hs
b
na+nbô K ]
with S = rl~a. Following Martin and Rogers (1995) and Martin (1999),
t is related to the quality of transport infrastructures. A réduction of r
will be regarded as the conséquence of a public policy improving transport
infrastructures between régions. As the partial derivative of 8 with r is
négative (|£ < 0), an increase of 5 will follow such public investment.
Second, the intertemporal optimization by consumers implies that the
growth rate of individual expenditures, Ea and Eb, is equal to the différence
between the interest rate and the rate of time préférence2 :
25° Èb
2 For a dérivation, see Grossman and Helpman (1991), chap. 3.Stéphane Riou 247
We may now define the equilibrium condition for the location of pro
duction plants 7 which is derived from the market clearing conditions of
the technological sector. The supply of each variety has to be equal to its
demand from consumers in both régions :
a _ aL(a -1) ( Ea _ EbS
xb _ aL(a -1) / EaS Eb
/3a \ N [7 + (1 — 7)6] N [yS -f (1 — 7
For constant shares of production plants (7) in the two régions, firms
must hâve no incentives to relocate their production. Then, firms must be
indiffèrent between producing in région a or b. This happens if na = nb or
xa = xb (cf. (9)). With 9 — Ef+Eb the share of per-capita expenditures
from région a, this equilibrium condition implies that we can solve (14) and
(15) for 7 :
0-(l-9)ô
7 (1-5)
Equation (16) illustrâtes the forward linkage at work in the model.
Firms in the increasing returns sector tend to locate in the région with the
highest level of per-capita expenditures. This is the traditional home mar
ket effect. The location equilibrium also dépends on the quality of transport
infrastructures. Through a direct effect, 8 is at the origin of a pecuniary ex-
ternality : the level of inter-regional infrastructures positively affects market
interactions and location choices towards large markets.
Finally, optimal size of firms (x) for a given level of expenditures is
obtained by combining (14) and (15) :
x = aL-^ with x = xa=xb (17)
Spatial knowledge spillovers and the equilibrium
growth
3.1 Imperfect knowledge spillovers between régions
The innovation sector works as in Grossman and Helpman (1991 chap. 3).
Innovation is a constant returns to scale activity for the individual firms but
producing external increasing returns to scale. The R&D productivity of a
new lab increases with the number of production plants. Therefore, know
ledge spillovers are transmitted from production to R&D. Two assumptions
are introduced concerning knowledge spillovers.248 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(3), 2003
The spatial dimension of technological relations
Knowledge spillovers are usually modeled as being perfectly intra or
inter-regional (see Englmann and Walz (1995), Walz (1996), Martin (1999)).
The assumption of intra-regional spillovers cornes from the marshallian ap-
proach of knowledge diffusion (cf. Marshall (1926)). In this approach, know
ledge is highly localized and is only locally transmitted to firms. Conver-
sely, inter-regional spillovers would define some knowledge flows between
régions. As in Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano (2001) and Baldwin and
Forslid (2000), we assume partially localized knowledge spillovers. Empiri-
cal studies as Eaton and Kortum (1997), Caballero and Jaffe (1993) and,
more recently, Maurseth and Verspagen (1999) suggest that inter-regional
spillovers are neither perfect nor nonexistent at an international or european
level.
At the régional level, Feldman (1994) and Jaffe (1989) give évidences
concerning intra-regional spillovers. The spatial proximity créâtes local in
teractions between firms and workers. This locally increases both spillovers
and R&D productivity. Nevertheless, in the european context, it's difficult
to abstract from the implications of the intégration process on knowledge
flows between régions. For Baldwin and Forslid (2000), lowering the cost of
trade in goods is only one aspect of régional intégration which also leads to
more technological relations between régions. Increasing cross-border mer-
ger and acquisition activities and business and personal travel would be
another facet of a more and more integrated economy. Finally, such process
would create a largely open technological environment with a declining cost
of trade in ideas and less impediments for knowledge flows.
That's why Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano (2001) or Baldwin and
Forslid (2000) introduce imperfect inter-regional spillovers. Nevertheless,
thèse models don't analyze the channels of diffusion and if a public policy
should improve them. We focus on thèse questions by assuming that two
main infrastructures may improve knowledge flows between firms located in
différent régions : transport and télécommunication infrastructures.
Transport and télécommunication infrastructures : two channels
of inter-regional spillovers
Most of the static or dynamic économie geography models assume
that an improvement in transport infrastructures only reduces the transac
tion cost on goods. When Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano (2001) introduce
inter-regional spillovers, they make a sharp distinction between infrastruc
tures which facilitate trade in goods and knowledge flows between régions.
Nevertheless, it is clear that some improvements in infrastructures which
reduce the transaction cost in goods also reduce the transaction cost in
ideas. The construction or the modernization of roads networks appears
as the most évident example of this double effect. The technological and
inter-regional relations between firms dépends on the individual mobility
because a part of the knowledge flows may concern tacit knowledge whichStéphane Riou 249
is better transmitted through personal contacts. Then, some good transport
infrastructures can facilitate thèse contacts. Therefore, we assume a posi
tive causality relation between the quality level of transport infrastructures
between régions and inter-regional knowledge flows. In this case, an impro-
vement in transport infrastructures facilitâtes both market and non market
interactions.
For this reason, we model the influence that transport infrastructures
hâve on knowledge flows with the same functional forai used for trade in
goods:
<5 = r1-'T
with r > 1, a > 1 and 0 < S < l3. Note that this functional form keeps
the same properties previously defined. As the partial derivative of ô with
respect to r is négative, we will regard an increase in <5 as an improvement
of transport infrastructures that facilitâtes inter-regional spillovers. Finally,
note that the parameter a, which is the elasticity of substitution between
goods, also will measure the degree of substitution between the knowledge
they contain. Therefore, we assume that the higher the elasticity of substi
tution between goods in a given economy is, the less the knowledge used
in their production process will be usable for new R.&D labs. This means
that for a given level of transport infrastructures, the incentives for inter
régional spillovers negatively dépends on this elasticity of substitution as S
is decreasing with a.
Télécommunication infrastructures are a second important channel of
knowledge diffusion. Quah (2000) argues that the new technologies of infor
mation and communication lead to new patterns relations in the knowledge
exchange for which the spatial impediment is weakened, requiring few di
rect interactions. Cairncross (2001) offers several évidences concerning the
decrease in the cost of knowledge diffusion. This author considère the deve-
lopment of the télécommunication infrastructures as the death of distance.
It is clear that the new technologies, by giving a digitized form to know
ledge, multiply the sources of information and facilitate its transmission.
Therefore, an effective and compétitive télécommunication System seems to
be a key factor in régional économie development. Concerning digital con
nections which allow access to the advanced networks and to modem data
transmission, a récent report of the European Commission suggests that
gaps remain across Union (European Commission (1999)). We will assume
that some inter-regional knowledge spillovers may be diffused by this chan
nel, depending on its quality level on which public policy can invest for




3 Note thaï the parameter 6 = r1 a is a particular formulation of the iceberg cost derived from the demand
functions. The iceberg cost implies that when an unit of good is traded, only a share ^ is consumed. The
same définition may be applied for knowledge : if each production plant represents a potential spillover for
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with Ttei > 1, <r > 1 and 0 < A < 1. The parameter Ttei may be viewed as an
iceberg cost on knowledge flows diffused by télécommunications. This cost
depending on the quality level of the télécommunication, we will regard an
increase in À (or decrease in rtei) as an improvement of télécommunication
infrastructures between régions. As in the case of transport infrastructures,
the incentives to transmit knowledge through télécommunication is weighted
by the elasticity of substitution between goods a.
Finally, we make the assumption that knowledge spillovers between
régions dépend on the average quality of inter-regional infrastructures of té
lécommunication and transport. New information and communication tech
nologies are not pure substitutes of transport infrastructures. Some know
ledge can be digitized and supplied from a distance, but most cannot and
needs infrastructures which facilitate face-to-face and personal contacts (Ve-
nables (2001), Gaspar and Glaeser (1998)). Then, both infrastructures must
be taken into account. The channels of inter-regional spillovers are defined
by the following variable :
with 0 < ô,X < 1.
3.2 The equilibrium location of innovation and growth
rate
Now, we must define how R&D labs are located and how the growth rate
of the economy is obtained.
The R&D sector is defined with the following innovation production
functions :
na = r)L'}N (7 + 0(1 - 7)) (19a)
if R&D labs locate in région a, and
nh = r)LbjN ((1 - 7) + O7) (196)
if R&D labs locate in région b. Lj is labor employed in R&D and 77 is a
productivity parameter.
With perfect capital mobility, R&D labs locate in both régions only
if the cost to engage capital in R&D investment is geographically the same.
With imperfect inter-regional knowledge spillovers (0 < Cl < 1) and w = 1
in both régions, it is less costly to invest in the région with the highest
number of production plants. As Ha(0) > Hb(0), pure rents induced by
investment in innovation are higher in région a for ail t. Therefore, région a
has the highest level of incomes and expenditures (0 > 5) and more firms
are located in this région in equilibrium :Stéphane Riou 251
For this reason, the R&D sector will only be active in région a. It is also
the région where the aggregate growth of the economy will be determined.
The equilibrium growth rate is derived from the incentives to innovate.
This requires the traditional condition of no arbitrage opportunity between
investing in R&D and borrowing at the safe rate r. Call v(t) the stock
market value of a firm equaling the présent discounted value of its profit.
That is,
„(*) = H e-ri»-t)Ê<ïLds (20)
Jt a — \
where r(t) represents the cumulative discount factor applicable to profits
earned at time t. Differentiating (20) with respect to time gives us the no
arbitrage condition which has to hold at every moment in time in order to
ensure capital-market equilibrium :
0x
v + = rv (21)
<T — 1
With free entry and zéro profits in the R&D sector, the value of a
firm is equal to the marginal cost of innovation c in the equilibrium. With
w = 1, this leads to the following equality :
c=t = (22)
At a steady state, 7 is constant. This means that na, nb and N will
grow at the same constant rate g = $. Therefore, c and v will decrease at
the same rate :
v c
- = - = -9 (23)
v c
Because also consumers expenditures are constant in steady state, the
interest rate r is equal to the rate of time préférence p (see Eq. (13)). With
équations (21) and (22), the arbitrage condition is now:
7TT j—\ (24)
Consider now the market clearing condition for labor. The labor cm-
ployed in R&D (L/) in the economy dépends on the aggregate growth rate :
r}N _ rjg
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With total demand in differentiated and homogeneous goods, the la-
bor market equilibrium is :
2L = Tïh r + ^Z^Ll (fîa + Eb) (26) 7+^(17) cr v } v ;
Substituting the optimal size of firms (17) in (24) and with (26), we
find the following growth rate :
H) (27)
The aggregate growth rate is sensitive to the location equilibrium
of the production plants (7). Contrary to Martin and Ottaviano (1999)
and Martin (1999) who assume perfectly localized spillovers, the aggregate
growth also dépends on firms located in région b. Nevertheless, as inter
régional spillovers are imperfectly transmitted, the growth rate is more sen
sitive to the spatial concentration in région a where R&D labs are located.
Note also that for a given location equilibrium an increase in inter-regional
infrastructures has a positive effect on growth.
Income inequality and steady state equilibrium
4.1 Income inequality and growth
The steady state of the model can be found by defining a last equilibrium
relation. We hâve already defined how the equilibrium location of firms
7 is determined by the expenditure inequality 9 (Eq. (16)) and how the
equilibrium growth rate g dépends on 7 (Eq. (27)). The last relation consists
in defining the income and expenditure inequality as a function of g.
In both régions, optimizing consumers set their expenditures at a per
manent income hypothesis level in steady state. Then, they will consume
their labor income, equals to 1 in both régions, and p times the value of the
initial per-capita stock of blueprints as only the profits of this initial stock
are pure rents. We get the following expressions for région a and région 6 :
With équations (21) and (23), the market value of a firm in the equi
librium is :
v = —?— (29)
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where v is a decreasing function of the growth rate g. This is a classical
relation in endogenous growth models like Grossman and Helpman (1991).
An increase in the growth rate means that more firms enter the market. The
future profits decreasing, this also détériorâtes the market value of capital.
Call h = ?jj- the share of capital owned by région a. Because of free
capital mobility, remember that this share will be constant through time and
fully given by the initial régional endowments Ha(0) and Hb(0). Inserting
the equilibrium profits in (29) and combining the resulting équation with
(28a) and (28b), we get the consumers' share of expenditures and income
in région a :
_ 1 v(g + p)+ap(Zh-l)
e~2 ^TS (30}
As Ha(Q) > Hb(0) and the capital is mobile and grows at the same
rate in both régions, we know that h > i. With Eq. (30), we can observe
that this inequality in the capital endowments leads to an income and ex
penditures inequality as 0 > | with h > |.
Note also that the income and expenditures gap is decreasing in g.
We know that, through a compétition effect, an increase in the growth rate
lowers the capital rent. As the capital rent is a more important part of the
total income in région a than in région b, résidents in région a will be more
sensitive to this income loss. For this reason, the income inequality between
régions decreases with higher growth. This means that the variables at the
origin of the aggregate growth, including transport and télécommunication
infrastructures, may hâve a positive effect on the réduction of income in
equality.
4.2 The steady state equilibrium
Now we close the model by defining the equilibrium location of firms and
the growth rate at the steady state. Inserting the growth rate équation in
(30), we get :




where 7 is solution of the following quadratic function :
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+ (-(l-5)L[—^--) -m{(l + 6)h-5)) =0, (32)
which admits two roots : one is positive, the other is négative. The positive
one gives the location equilibrium at the steady state :
- (i - s)(A + m) + V(i - s)2(A + pnY - albc
7 = 2LB (33)
with A = L((5 + \) + ^-l),B = (l-ô)(2-(\ + 6)) and
C - (-(1 - 5)L (*±$) - pq ((1 + S)h - S)). The equilibrium value of g at
the steady state follows by inserting Eq. (33) in Eq. (27).
5 Régional policies and welfare analysis
As in Martin (1999), we focus now on policies improving infrastructures and
their effects on firms location 7, on the geography of incomes and expendi-
tures 9 and on the aggregate growth rate g. In addition, we study whether
the agglomération of firms in the market equilibrium (7) is efficient from a
welfare point of view for the economy as a whole when knowledge spillovers
are not perfectly localized. We also ask whether the welfare gains or losses
from a marginal change in économie geography are sensitive to the quality
of télécommunication infrastructures.
5.1 Public policies, régional equity and aggregate growth
Assuming perfectly localized spillovers, Martin (1999) displays how most of
the public policies on infrastructures used in Europe face a policy trade-
off between régional equity and growth. For instance, the improvement of
transport infrastructures between régions leads to higher growth and lower
income inequality but reinforces industrial concentration in the rich région.
Nevertheless, the fact that knowledge spillovers are perfectly localized does
not allow for an analysis on how a decreasing cost of trading ideas between
régions may change this trade-off. With no capital mobility, Baldwin, Martin
and Ottaviano (2001) show that the inter-regional knowledge diffusion has
important effects on the geography of industry and on global growth. In this
model, a decrease in the cost of trading ideas promotes industrialization in
the poor région because of a better access to knowledge located in the
rich one. Nevertheless, this leads to a lower global growth. Contrary to our
spécification, the authors do not distinguish between différent channels of
diffusion and do not focus on the way public policies may improve them.
We can give intuitions concerning the impacts that an infrastructure
policy will hâve on industrial concentration.Stéphane Riou 255
First, suppose that a policy improves télécommunication infrastruc
tures. The effect is easily observed. According to the growth rate équation
(Eq. (27)), this policy helps knowledge diffusion from firms located in région
b to R&D labs in région a. This leads to higher growth rate and lower ca
pital rents which reduce the share of income in région a (Eq. (30)). Finally,
the lower differential between the size of the régional markets implies firms'
relocation to région b and a spatial déconcentration (Eq. (16)).
Second, an improvement in transport infrastructures has more ambi-
guous effects. This cornes from the fact that in our spécification, transport
infrastructures facilitate both market and non market interactions between
régions. Depending on which type of interactions is facilitated, this public
policy will hâve opposite effects on the geography of industry :
- the first effect is well known and cornes from the fact that this policy
improves inter-regional trade in goods. It makes easier for firms in the
rich région to supply the poor one by trade. Then, because of increasing
returns, it increases the attractiveness of the rich région. The sign of the
partial derivative of 7 with respect to 6 (cf. Eq. (16)) for a given income
inequality confirms this intuition :
dj 20-1
ÔS~{1- 8)2
The sign is positive as long as région a has a larger market size than région
b(B> 1/2).
- the second effect cornes from the more important knowledge spillovers dif-
fused with transport infrastructures. As for télécommunication infrastruc
tures, the public policy strengthens knowledge flows and then, increases
the global growth rate. This reduces the income differential between ré
gions and attracts firms in the poor one.
Thèse two opposite effects work in the steady state equilibrium. If the
centripetal "home market" effect is higher, the public policy will hâve a posi
tive growth effect. If the centrifugal effect, through inter-regional spillovers,
is dominant, the impact on growth is ambiguous. While more inter-regional
spillovers will be favorable to growth, less industrial agglomération deprives
R&D labs of local spillovers.
The net effects of an improvement in transport infrastructures both
on growth and on industrial agglomération are given in the following pro
position :
Proposition 1 Even if a policy improving inter-regional transport
infrastructures can generate a centrifugal force through non market inter
actions, the net effect is an increase in industrial agglomération (i) and a
higher growth rate (ii).
Proof 1 (see Appendix A).
Proposition 1 gives the simultaneous effects of a transport policy on
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spillovers does not offset the home market effect. Note that the higher
growth has two origins. First, the increasing concentration in région a leads
to more local spillovers for R&D labs which locate there. Second, inter
régional spillovers are better transmitted after the transport infrastructure
policy.
As the growth rate increases, more firms enter the market and,
through a compétition effect, the capital income is reduced. Région a being
more dépendent on the capital income, nominal income disparity between
régions is also reduced. Martin (1999) shows that the net effect of this policy
on real income inequality is more complex because of its impact on the price
index in the two régions4. If nominal income disparity is reduced, the index
price in région a decreases as less of the goods hâve to be imported and the
transport cost on each of them is lower. In région b, more agglomération
in the other région implies that a more important number of goods hâve
to be imported but for a lower transport cost. Then, as shown in Martin
(1999) and Martin and Ottaviano (1999), the relative price index changes
in favor of the rich région (d(Pn/Pb)/d5 < 0), but if the transport cost
is already low, the effect on price indices is not sufficiently important for
offset the réduction of nominal income disparity. In this case, the public
policy on transport infrastructures will also imply a decrease in real income
inequality.
Finally, we can give intuitions concerning the effect of financing this
public policy. If the improvement is paid by a third party, it will not mo-
dify the preceding results. Nevertheless, if the infrastructures are paid by
the rich région, this may lead to an income effect reinforcing the centri-
fugal effect from inter-regional spillovers. Then, the increase in industrial
agglomération may be reversed. This would hâve very ambiguous effects on
aggregate growth because this would induce less intra-regional spillovers in
the rich région but inter-regional spillovers would be more important and
better transmitted.
Suppose now that the public policy improves the télécommunication
infrastructures. Contrary to a decrease in inter-regional transport cost, such
policy has no direct impact on market interactions, but only facilitâtes know-
ledge flows between régions. For this reason, the following proposition sug-
gests that this public policy can attain both objectives of régional equity
and higher aggregate growth :
Proposition 2 A régional policy improving télécommunication infra
structures reduces industrial agglomération (i) and leads to higher growth
rate (ii).
Proof 2 (Appendix A)
The first part of the proposition confirms that a better access for
R&D labs to knowledge located in the poor région may decrease industrial
4 The pries Index in each région is given by the following functions :
Pn = (fia/a - 1)W1/d-")(7 + (î(1 _7))1/(1-">, pb = (0a/a -Stéphane Riou 257
agglomération. As the cost of innovation decreases, more firms enter the
raarket. This reduces income of capital and as the rich région is more sensi-
tive to this réduction, the nominal income inequality is less important after
the public policy. Moreover. the second part of the proposition suggest that
the net effect on growth is positive. The endogenous réduction of spatial
concentration which implies a loss of intra-regional spillovers is more than
offset by the exogenous decrease in the cost of innovation induced by the
improvement in télécommunication infrastructures.
Note that real income inequality is reduced as nominal inequality is
lower and the price index in région a is higher but decreases in région b
because more of the goods are locally produced.
If the rich région finances the public policy, it will strengthen the
relocation of firms in the poor one. As long as the positive growth effect
induced by better télécommunication infrastructures dominâtes the négative
effect of such relocation, the net impact on growth will be positive.
5.2 Welfare analysis
Many distortions at work in the model suggest that the spatial concen
tration in the market equilibrium is not the optimal one. A first group of
standard distortions pertain to the models with monopolistic compétition
and horizontal product innovation (Grossman and Helpman (1991)). We
are more interested in a second group of distortions inhérent to the firm
location choices.
First, because inter-regional spillovers are imperfectly transmitted, an
increase in 7 will always increase the growth rate in the economy. Firms do
not acknowledge this positive externalities. For this reason, the spatial con
centration at the market equilibrium is too low. This growth effect indicates
that a planner may improve a part of the welfare in both régions by increa-
sing the spatial concentration in the rich région (région a). Nevertheless,
such relocation of firms will hâve others welfare impacts for région a and
région 6. On the one hand. when capital flows increase agglomération of
firms, more local spillovers are produced in région a. This in turn reduces
the nominal wealth by reducing the cost of innovation and the value of the
capital (wealth effect). If a larger initial stock of capital is allocated to région
a, this région will hâve a larger loss than région 6. On the other hand, we
hâve aiready noted that new locations of firms in a région create a transport
cost effect. The consumers in this région save the transport cost on the new
goods produced locally. This increases their real wealth. But such reloca
tions decrease the real wealth in the région of origin since local consumers
now hâve to pay the transport cost on a larger number of goods. Thèse three
effects can be formally defined by calculating (1) in steady state. Then, we
can write the indirect utility of a représentative consumer in région a and258 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(3), 2003
région 6 as a function of 7. We get the following expressions :
(34)
where 5 is the steady state growth rate given by (27). Differentiating ex
pressions (34) and (35) with respect to 7, we obtain the welfare impact in
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(37)
The three terms on the right hand side of (36) and (37) are, respecti-
vely, the growth, wealth and transport cost effects. The first common term
is the positive impact on the growth rate of an increase of 7. The second
élément is négative in both expressions and represents the welfare loss due
to the higher growth rate lowering the value of capital owned by résidents.
The third term represents the transport cost effect. This eflfect has the ex-
pected signs since it is positive for région a and négative for région 6. We
can now establish the desirability of the market determined geography in
terms of régional welfare. Then, we hâve to sign (36) and (37) at the mar
ket equilibrium given in (33). The resulting expressions being too complex
for analytical results, we présent numerical examples summarized in Table
1 (see Appendix B). The first row gives a benchmark case with numerical
values already used in Martin and Ottaviano (1999) with perfectly localized
spillovers. For this case, both régions would gain from a marginal increase
in spatial concentration in région a with respect to the market outeome.
The other rows show that more concentration in the rich région (région a)
improves the welfare in the poor région (région b) when the négative wealth
and transport cost effects are offset by the positive growth effect. As inStéphane Riou 259
Martin and Ottaviano (1999), this is the case when the elasticity of substi
tution between goods a is low, the share of differentiated goods consumed
a is high or the global market L is large. Furthermore, low transport costs
t also promotes a gain in the poor région from more concentration in the
rich one. For low transport costs, the relocation of firms to the rich région
does not deteriorate too much the welfare in the poor one, contrary to a
case with a high transport cost.
More interestingly, the first and fifth rows in Table 1 show how the wel
fare gain from more agglomération in each région is sensitive to the quality
of télécommunication infrastructures. For poor infrastructures {rtei = 1.6),
higher welfare gains are derived from an increase in 7 than for a better qua
lity level (rtei = 1.2). The Figure 1, which plots équations (36) and (37) for
the benchmark case with respect to Ttei, confirms this resuit. The welfare
gains in both régions décline with an increasing quality level of télécommu
nication infrastructures (rtei —> 1). Finally, when télécommunications are
nearly perfect, more agglomération in région a leads to a loss of welfare in
région b.





This shows that the desirability of more spatial concentration highly
dépends on the efficiency of the channels of knowledge diffusion. When té
lécommunications between régions are efficient, technological knowledge is
easily diffused from région 6 to région a. In this case, the relocation of firms
to the rich région leads to a limited gain in terms of spillovers and growtk
effect. Conversely, a poor infrastructure is an impediment to inter-regional
spillovers. In this case, the growth is mainly produced by local spillovers in
région a. For this reason, through the growth effect, the résidents in both
régions benefit more from more agglomération in région a.260 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(3), 2003
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an extension of the model of growth, geography
and public policies of Martin (1999). We introduce imperfect knowledge spil-
lovers between régions and infrastructures which facilitate their diffusion.
Hence, we model some improvements in transport infrastructures which are
conducive to lower trade costs and a better knowledge diffusion. Through
its impact on knowledge spillovers, an investment in inter-regional trans
port infrastructures can lead to a relocation of firms in the poor région.
Nevertheless, the traditional centripetal effect coming from market interac
tions always générâtes more spatial concentration. Even if this aggloméra
tion effect increases growth, this confirms the resuit of Martin (1999) : an
investment in transport infrastructures may not attain both the objectives
of higher growth and less régional disparities. We show that an improve-
ment in télécommunication infrastructures doesn't lead to this trade-off.
Such investment générâtes higher growth and more even spatial distribu
tion of économie activities. This policy has the same desired effects than the
decrease in the cost of innovation suggested by Martin (1999). Finally, we
hâve presented a welfare analysis. A more concentrated économie geography
is not always detrimental to immobile workers in the poor région because of
a positive growth effect. Nevertheless, we hâve shown that the gains from
more agglomération decrease with the quality level of télécommunication
infrastructures.
The main point in this paper is to suggest that the various functions
of infrastructures should be taken into account by policy makers. A public
investment in roads or railways networks has not only an impact on trade in
goods but also on trade in ideas. Most of the time, the économie geography
models do not consider the second effect, while it may hâve implications
on the geography of économie activities. This question calls for an addi-
tional research. For simplification in the model presented hère, the same
functional form is used to define the effect of transport infrastructures on
knowledge flows and trade in goods. In another récent paper, we make the
R&D sector more complicated by distinguishing between the elasticity of
substitution between goods and the elasticity of substitution between ideas
(Riou (2002)). Hence, we show that when ideas are very complementary,
an improvement in transport infrastructures leads to a strong centrifugal
effect which can more than compensâtes the centripetal effect coming from
market interactions.Stéphane Riou 261
Appendix A
Proof 1
(i) The first part of the proof consists in showing that a marginal impro-
vement in transport infrastructures increases the industrial agglomération
in région a. Then, we search for the sign of the partial derivative of 7 with
respect to <5 for a given inequality in capital endowment between régions




The partial derivatives of thèse two preceding équations with respect
to S are :
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Denominator of jj$ is positive for ail h > 5.
As pq{2h - 1) > 0 and pq{l - 2h) < 0, a condition for §2 > 0 is :
1 — 7 < 47
Tins is always verified for ail 7 > £.
(ii) Second, we prove that |f > 0.
As sign|§ <=^ sign'^+ 2dô ^-s we obtain :
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As §J > 0 and ^ < 1 for ail ô, A e]0,1[, we verify that :
dô *
Proof 2
(i) We search now for the sign of the partial derivative of 7 with respect
to A and for h > 5. As in the preceding proof, we insert ff in §^. After
simplifications, we get :
d1 = w(l-2fe)(l+ *)(!-7) f
dX (1 - S) (2L (7 + ^(1 - 7)) + Pn)2 - (1 + *W(1 " 2h) (1 - *±±) L
With h > 5, the numerator is négative. Then, for |^ < 0, the de-
nominator must be positive. This is the case as long as h > \ and the
inter-regional spillovers are imperfect, that is ^^ < 1.
(ii) Second, we demonstrate that f^ > 0.
a • do ■ 0(7+^(1—>))
As sign^ ^^> sign-1 ^ L, we get :
sign— «=► sign 1 — — + -(1 - 7)
OA \\ L j OA ià
After substitution of the partial derivative of 7 with respect to A,
obtained in the first part of the proof, we get :
dg _ 1 (2L(7+ ^(1 -7)) +pr})2 (1 -5)2(l-7)
d\ ~ 2 (i-s) (2L (7 + ^(1 - 7)) + pr})2 - (1+ ô)pr)(l - 2h) (l - ^) L
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